The Department of Justice’s new National Fraud Enforcement Division (the “Fraud Division”) has given companies a clearer picture of both the fraud it intends to pursue aggressively and the factors that will drive its corporate enforcement decisions.i
DOJ Identifies Its Priorities
In a directive issued October 1, DOJ instructed Fraud Division prosecutors to prioritize corporate fraud involving health care, government contracting and procurement, significant revenue evasion, tariff evasion, the importation of goods or services, and forced labor.
The directive does not replace DOJ’s broader corporate-enforcement framework; it expressly requires Fraud Division prosecutors to apply the Department’s existing Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations and Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy in its implementation.
The directive also identifies ten factors prosecutors must give “great weight” when deciding whether to bring corporate charges and when negotiating resolutions. Among them: management involvement, concealment from regulators or auditors, misconduct lasting three years or more, conduct spanning at least three federal districts, and losses of at least $25 million or harm to 25 or more victims.
DOJ Is Centralizing Corporate Enforcement
The directive also gives DOJ’s new Corporate Enforcement Section (the “Section”) a significant role in corporate cases. Prosecutors must report existing corporate investigations to the Section within seven days, notify the Section of new investigations and major developments, and involve the Section throughout corporate investigations and resolutions. The Section will also take primary responsibility for assessing companies’ compliance with corporate criminal resolutions.
DOJ Signals Additional Whistleblower Incentives
DOJ also directed Division leadership to develop new policies and programs to encourage whistleblowers to come forward with information about criminal fraud—including whistleblowers who participated in the conduct themselves.
The directive does not yet establish the contours of those programs. But the express focus on incentivizing potentially culpable insiders bears watching, particularly as DOJ continues to expand the ways it identifies fraud independently of corporate self-disclosures.
What This Means for Companies
Companies, litigators, and enforcement lawyers should take note: DOJ has now identified the types of corporate fraud cases it intends to prioritize and the facts that will weigh heavily in charging and resolution decisions.
The directive is the latest in a series of recent changes to DOJ’s fraud enforcement policies. DOJ is encouraging companies to disclose misconduct and cooperate, while also building out the personnel, technology, and data analytics it can use to identify potential fraud on its own.
For companies in the industries DOJ has identified, this is the latest warning shot. But the directive is not simply a statement that DOJ intends to bring more corporate cases; it also directs prosecutors to distinguish among degrees of corporate malfeasance and to avoid overbroad enforcement against legitimate business operations. Companies should take another look at existing compliance risks, particularly where management may have been involved, misconduct has been actively concealed, the conduct has continued for several years or is otherwise widespread, or the potential financial exposure is significant. Those are now among the factors DOJ has expressly told its prosecutors to consider.
i Our Emergency Envelopes and related articles have discussed several recent DOJ memoranda that have addressed federal investigation and prosecution in this realm. See, e.g.,:
B. Todd Jones, “The Evolving Role of Internal Corporate Investigations: Why Proactive Oversight Matters More Than Ever,” New York Law Journal, April 7, 2025, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2025/04/07/the-evolving-role-of-internal-corporate-investigations-why-proactive-oversight-matters-more-than-ever/.
B. Todd Jones, Bahram Samie, and Allen Slaughter, “The New Playbook: How the DOJ Decides Whether to Prosecute a Corporation,” Emergency Envelope 1, no. 1 (July 2026), https://www.robinskaplan.com/newsroom/insights/the-new-playbook-how-doj-decides-whether-to-prosecute-a-corporation.
Allen Slaughter and B. Todd Jones, “DOJ’s New Fraud Division: The Priorities Are Familiar. The Enforcement Model Is Not,” Emergency Envelope 1, no. 2 (September 2026), https://www.robinskaplan.com/newsroom/insights/dojs-new-fraud-division-the-priorities-are-familiar-the-enforcement-model-is-not.
Carla Baumel, Bahram Samie, and Allen Slaughter, “DOJ Revises Its FCA Playbook,” Robins Kaplan LLP, September 23, 2026, https://www.robinskaplan.com/newsroom/insights/doj-revises-its-fca-playbook.
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